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I. INTRODUCTION
Few decisions of the United States Supreme Court have triggered
more interest and emotion than the Court's recent opinion in New
York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York.' In this
decision the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a New
York City ordinance2 which prohibits those "private clubs" which
possess certain attributes3 from discriminating on the basis of race,
creed, sex or other grounds in their membership policies.4
Two competing interests were at odds in this case: the consti-
tutional right of freedom of association 5 and the City's interest in
ensuring that minorities and women have equal access to certain
business opportunities.6 The Court found that the City's interest was
sufficiently legitimate to justify an intrusion into the private clubs'
1. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
2. NEw YORK CrTy, N.Y., ADnw. CODE § 8.102 (1986).
3. The private clubs covered by this ordinance contain at least 400 members, provide regular
meal service" and receive regular payments "directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers
for the furtherance of a business." NEw YORK Crry, N.Y., ADMqn. CODE § 8.102(9) (1986).
4. Id.
5. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (the Supreme Court clearly
articulated a right of association).
6. The City Council of New York strongly advocated this interest when it stated, "It is hereby
found and declared that the city of New York has a compelling interest in providing its citizens an
environment where all persons, regardless of race, creed, color, national origin or sex, have a fair
and equal opportunity to participate in the business and professional life of the city, and may be
unfettered in availing themselves of employment opportunities." LocAL LAW No. 63 of 1984, § 1,
App. 14-15.
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freedom of association, and held that the City's authority arose from
its general police power to regulate activities, within the limits pro-
vided by the Constitution. 7
The interest in and significance of this decision may be better
appreciated when one considers the historical attachment of Amer-
ican society to associations and private clubs. As one author has
recently recognized:
[Flor many there is one overriding reason for joining. An association can help
restore an individual's self identity and self confidence, attributes which are con-
tinually eroded by the anonymity, change and pace of life in our complex so-
ciety . . . . This strong commitment to the associative freedom results from the
traditional benefits resulting from its exercise.8
Likewise, a brief submitted by the New York State Club Association
identified the benefits which are derived from membership in private
clubs and associations:
For more than a century, private clubs have played a critical role in the fabric
of American society. Social commentators and historians as early as de Tocqueville
have observed that private clubs contribute to the principles of diversity and plu-
ralism which underlie our culture. Private clubs at once foster a citizen's search
for self-identification and provide a forum for interpersonal relationship and the
expression of ideals, be they political, cultural or social.'
It appears that the longstanding traditions of private club mem-
bership in American culture partly justify the public's concern as
to whether the Court's ruling in New York State Club Association
tolled the death knell for the "all male all white club" which has
become so typical in our society. 10 However, in both Roberts v.
United States Jaycees" and Board of Directors of Rotary Interna-
tional v. Rotary Club, 2 the Court had already upheld the consti-
tutionality of state statutes which prohibit private organizations from
discriminating on the basis of gender in their membership policies.
7. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
8. Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. REv.
1878, 1901 (1984).
9. Brief for Appellant at, New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (No. 86-1836)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, Brief file).
10. See Jacoby, Blackballing the Men's Club, NEWS WmK, July 4, 1988, at 62.
11. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
12. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987).
[Vol. 91
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The New York Club State Association opinion appears, therefore,
to be part of a general scheme which is being developed by the
Court, rather than an isolated decision. This comment will attempt
to define the underlying rationale of these recent Supreme Court
decisions and will strive to define the scope of the Court's New
York Club State Association ruling.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Enacted in 1965, the New York City Human Rights Law13 for-
bade invidious discrimination in "places of public accommodation,
resort or amusement.' ' 4 The ordinance excluded from its definition
of "public accommodation"'' 5 "any institution, club or place of ac-
commodation which is in its nature distinctly private."' 16 The or-
dinance, however, did not define the meaning of the term "distinctly
private."
In 1984, the New York City Council amended its Human Rights
Law to provide that a club
shall not be considered in its nature distinctly private if it (1) has more than four
hundred members, (2) provides regular meal service, and (3) regularly receives
payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals and beverages
directly or indirectly from or on behalf of non-members for the furtherance of
trade or business.' 7
By this amendment, the City Council intended to defeat "discrim-
inatory practices of certain membership organizations where business
deals are often made.' ' 8 Its purpose was, therefore, to provide "its
citizens an environment where all persons, regardless of race, creed,
color, national origin or sex, have a fair and equal opportunity to
participate in the business and professional life of the city."' 9
13. NEw YORK CnTy, N.Y. ADnm. CODE § 8.107(2) (1986).
14. Id.
15. NEW YoRK CITy, N.Y. ADrm. CODE § 8.102(9) (1986).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. LocAL LAW No. 63 of 1984, § 1, App. 14-15.
19. Id.
1989]
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Immediately after the ordinance's enactment, the New York State
Club Association 20 challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance
under the first and fourteenth amendments. 2' The action was initially
brought before the Supreme Court of New York County, which
granted the City's motion for summary judgment. On appeal by the
State Club Association, the second Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court held that the City's law did not offend the
due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal
constitutions.22 The State Club Association appealed this decision to
the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower courts'
rulings in a unanimous opinion.23 The Court of Appeals ruled that
the city ordinance was a valid constitutional exercise of police power
and that it did not violate the club members' rights of privacy, free
speech or association under the federal constitution. 24 The United
States Supreme Court, on appeal, affirmed the judgment of the New
York Court of Appeals. 25
III. PRIOR HISTORY
As already suggested in the introduction to this comment, the
New York State Club Association decision is not really surprising.
On two prior occasions, in Jaycees and Rotary, the Supreme Court
has demonstrated its willingness to enforce under certain circum-
stances a state's interference with organizational freedom of asso-
ciation in order to prevent discrimination in membership policies. 26
In both decisions, the Court's analysis of the right of freedom of
association was central to its decision to accede to the state's reg-
ulatory authority. A quick overview of this analysis may be useful
20. The New York State Club Association is an association of 125 private clubs and associations
in the state of New York, a substantial number of which are located in the city of New York. Brief
for Appellant at, New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (No. 86-1836) (LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Brief file).
21. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 2225.
22. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 118 A.D.2d 392, 505 N.Y.S.2d 152
(1986), aff'd, New York State Club Ass'n, v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915
(1987), aff'd, New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 2225.
23. New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915.
24. Id.
25. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 2225.
26. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1986); Rotary, 107 S. Ct. 1940.
[Vol. 91
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to fully understand the Court's reasoning in the Jaycees and Rotary
decisions.
Since its general recognition of a right of association in NAACP
v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson,7 the Supreme Court has analyzed
different types of associative rights distinguishing some from oth-
ers. 28 Among them, the most fundamental both in constitutional
terms and for purpose of this analysis are the right of intimate
association and the right of expressive association. 29
The right of intimate association is implicitly protected by the
Bill of Rights and relates to the fundamental right of privacy.30 It
includes, for instance, the freedom to choose one's spouse,3' the
ability of a grandmother and a grandson to share the same home3 2
and a married couple's right to use contraceptives23 Justice Bren-
nan's majority opinion in Jaycees reflected the philosophy under-
lying the Court's recognition of the privacy right.a4 Justice Brennan
stated: "Because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual
liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain
kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanc-
tuary from unjustified interference by the state. ' 35 It is clear that,
before upholding the right of private association in any given case,
the Court will consider the degree of intimacy and selectivity in-
volved in the relationship sought to be protected. The relationship
must display "deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily
few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special com-
munity of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively
personal aspects of one's life. ' 3 6 Significantly, most decisions up-
holding the right of freedom of private association concern the fa-
milial circle despite the fact that Justice Powell, in Rotary, argued
27. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449.
28. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 609; Rotary, 107 S. Ct. 1940.
29. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609; Rotary, 107 S. Ct. 1940.
30. Rotary, 107 S. Ct. at 1965.
31. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).
32. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609.
35. Id. at 618.
36. Id. at 619-20.
1989]
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that "we have not held that constitutional protection is restricted
to relationships among family members." 37
The second aspect of the right of association, the right of ex-
pressive association, is implicit in the exercise of activities expressly
protected by the first amendment, such as freedom of speech or
freedom of religion. 38 As stated by one author, "What the Court
has recognized . . .is a right to join with others to pursue goals
independently protected by the first amendment . . . . 3 The as-
sumption underlying this analysis is that the right to associate with
others facilitates the exercise of the freedom of speech or religion.
This right protects from governmental intrusion the activities of large
associative organizations that would not otherwise be entitled to claim
a right of private association. As a matter of fact, this right to
expressive association cannot be restricted by the government unless
a compelling governmental interest, unrelated to the suppression of
ideas, warrants the restriction imposed.40 Moreover, the Supreme
Court requires that the states demonstrate that no other means less
restrictive of this right are available to achieve the interest at stake.4'
This dual analysis was emphasized in the Court's reasoning in both
Jaycees and Rotary.
In Jaycees, the Minneapolis and St. Paul Chapters of the United
States Jaycees challenged before the Minnesota Department of Hu-
man Rights the national organization's policy of excluding women
from full membership on the grounds that this policy violated the
Minnesota Human Rights Act.42 This Act provides that it would be
an "unfair discriminatory practice to deny any person the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation
because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or
sex."' 43 In response to this challenge, the Jaycees' national organi-
37. Rotary, 107 S. Ct. at 1946.
38. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-09 (1982).
39. L. TRIE, AmRIPCAN CoNsTrr TioNAL LAW 702 (1978).
40. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609.
41. Id. at 623.
42. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609.
43. MiNN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 3 (1982).
[Vol. 91
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zation brought suit in federal court to prevent enforcement of the
Minnesota Human Rights Act on the ground that this act violated
its constitutional right of freedom of association. 44 The district court
entered judgment against the national organization. 45 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that the statute substantially interfered with the Jaycees' freedom
of association and was unconstitutionally vague.46 Granting certio-
rari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Ap-
peals .47
In Jaycees, the Court referred to the two forms of constitu-
tionally protected freedom of association (private and expressive)
and set a distinct standard of review for each of them." The Court
stated that
the nature and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom of association
may vary depending on the extent to which one or the other aspect of the con-
stitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given case. We therefore find it
useful to consider separately the effect of applying the Minnesota statute to the
Jaycees on what could be called its members' freedom of intimate association
and their freedom of expressive association.49
Following its analytical framework, the Court defeated the Jaycees'
claim that their rights of private association were violated by stating
that many features of the Jaycee organization itself prevented it from
succeeding on this ground. 0 The Court focused on the size of the
chapters, the absence of any criteria to judge the applicants, the
nonselectivity of the membership process, and the participation of
non-members in the chapters' activities.51 In other words, the Jaycee
chapters did not meet the requirements of "relative smallness, a high
degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affili-
ation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relation-
44. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609.
45. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (1982), rev'd, United States Jaycees
v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609.
46. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560.
47. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 618.
50. Id. at 620.
51. Id. at 621.
1989]
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ship."'5 2 Turning its attention to the Jaycees' claim of infringement
on their right of freedom of expressive association, the Court ad-
mitted that requiring the Jaycees to admit women as full members
constituted such an infringement.5 3 However, the Court went on to
state that this right of expressive association is not absolute and may
be overcome if a compelling state interest, unrelated to the sup-
pression of ideas, justifies interference with it. 4
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Jaycees recognized that
Minnesota had a compelling interest in "eradicating gender discrim-
ination in the allocation of publicly available goods and service." ' 55
The opinion further stated that removing "the barriers to economic
advancement and political and social integration that have histori-
cally plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including women, ' 56
justified the state's infringement upon the Jaycees' freedom of ex-
pressive association. Moreover, the Court found that the Jaycees
failed to demonstrate that the admission of women as full voting
members imposed any serious burden on their freedom of expressive
association.5 7 The Court stated that "[tihe Act requires no change
in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the interest of young men, and
it imposes no restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude
individuals with ideologies or philosophies different from those of
its existing members. 58 Therefore, the Jaycees' claim of untoward
interference with their right of expressive association failed.
Three years later, in Rotary, the Supreme Court had the op-
portunity to reaffirm its analysis.59 The facts giving rise to this case
are unusual. Following its admission of women to active member-
ship, the Rotary Club of Duarte, California had its charter revoked
and its membership in the Rotary International terminated 0 The
Club then sued the international organization alleging violation of
52. Id. at 620.
53. Id. at 623.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 624.
56. Id. at 626.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 627.
59. Rotary, 107 S. Ct. 1940.
60. Id. at 1943.
[Vol. 91
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the Unruth Civil Rights Act, which entitles "all persons, regardless
of sex, to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
privileges and services in all business establishments in the state. ' 6'
The Los Angeles Superior Court entered judgment in favor of Ro-
tary International. 62 On appeal by the Club of Duarte, the California
Court of Appeals reversed .6 The Rotary International then appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision
of the California Court of Appeals in favor of the local club. 4
In Rotary, Justice Powell's majority opinion referred directly to
the framework established in Jaycees to analyze the Rotary Inter-
national's constitutional claim.65 He stated that "[i]n [Jaycees] we
determined the nature and degree of constitutional protection by
considering separately the effect of the challenged state action on
an individual's freedom of private association and freedom of ex-
pressive association. We follow the same course in this case." ' 66
Accordingly, the Court examined the Rotary International's claim
of unjustified governmental interference with its private right of as-
sociation. The Court denied protection to the club on this ground,
stressing that the relationship among Rotary Club members did not
involve the degree of intimacy or privacy which is necessary for
constitutional protection.67 To reach this conclusion, the Court fo-
cused on the size of the local club, the percentage of annual "turn-
over" among its members, the involvement of outsiders in the club's
activities, and the club's participation in projects of quasi-public
nature .6  The Court concluded that these characteristics demon-
strated that the Rotary Clubs sought to "keep their windows and
doors open to the whole world" and precluded any claim of right
of private association.6 9
61. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 51 (West 1982).
62. Rotary, 107 S. Ct. 1940.
63. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 178 Cal. App. 3d
1035, (1986), aff'd, Rotary, 107 S. Ct. 1940.
64. Rotary, 107 S. Ct. 1940.
65. Id. at 1945.
66. Id. at 1945.
67. Id. at 1946.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1947.
1989]
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The Rotary Clubs were no more successful in their claim of un-
justified governmental interference with their right of expressive as-
sociation.70 The Court concluded that the Clubs did not demonstrate
that the admission of women would affect, in a significant way, the
members' ability to carry on their various purposes of "providing
humanitarian services, encouraging high ethical standards in all vo-
cations, and helping build goodwill and peace in the world."' T In
other words, the Court did not find any evidence that the admission
of women would impair the members' exercise of their first amend-
ment rights. Moreover, the Court found that the state interest in
eliminating discrimination against women and assuring them "equal
access to the acquisition of leadership skills and business contacts
as well as tangible goods and services was "compelling. ' 72
Thus, in both the Jaycees and Rotary decisions, the Court war-
ranted a governmental interference with some associations' mem-
bership policies. Each time the Court denied these associations any
claim of freedom of private association by considering, among other
things, their size, their lack of selectivity, and the involvement of
non-members in the groups' activities. Each time, the Court con-
ditioned the success of a claim of violation of freedom of expressive
association upon a finding that the exercise of the first amendment
right would be automatically impaired by the admission of women
members. 73 Moreover, in both decisions the state's interest in en-
suring women equal access to business contacts and employment
promotion was deemed "compelling." 74
Therefore, the framework for the New York decision was in
place, providing clear guidelines for the Court's analysis, and sig-
naling the trend the Court would follow in future cases. Thus, in
New York State Club Association, the lower courts considered the
70. Id.
71. The Rotary Manual of Procedure describes in the following terms the Rotary International:
"[A]n organization of business and professional men united worldwide who provide humanitarian
service, encourage high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the
world." Rotary International, THE ROTARY MAuAL OF PROCEDURE 7 (1981).
72. Rotary, 107 S. Ct. at 1948.
73. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609; Rotary, 107 S. Ct. 1940.
74. Jaycees. 468 U.S. 609; Rotary, 107 S. Ct. 1940.
[Vol. 91
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Supreme Court's reasoning in the Jaycee and Rotary decisions and
upheld the constitutionality of the New York City ordinance. 75
IV. ANALYsIs
Initially, the Supreme Court addressed a procedural question re-
garding the New York Club Association's standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the city ordinance on behalf of its members. 76
The Court, applying the test enunciated in Hunt v. Washington Ap-
ple,77 determined that the Club Association had standing to sue on
behalf of its members because "its members would have standing
to bring this same suit on behalf of their own individual members," 7 8
whose associative rights "are suffering immediate or threatened
injury" 79 as a "result of the law's enactment." 80
The Court then examined the first amendment challenge to the
validity of the city ordinance.8 ' As already indicated, the Supreme
Court followed the analytical framework set in Jaycees and Rotary
to determine if the clubs' freedom of association had been uncon-
stitutionally infringed upon. The Court's inquiry, however, reflected
the fact that the New York Club Association challenged, on its face,
the constitutionality of the city's ordinance. 82 As a matter of fact,
the Court did not have to proceed to an analysis of the facts of
the particular case, as in Jaycees and Rotary, but only had to de-
termine whether on its face the ordinance violated the first amend-
ment. 83
There are traditionally two different ways in which a statute may
be considered invalid "on its face." First, the statute may be invalid
because it is unconstitutional in every conceivable application and
can never be applied in a valid manner.8 4 In such a situation, the
75. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 2225.
76. Id. at 2231.
77. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
78. New York State Club Assn, 108 S. Ct. at 2231.
79. Id. at 2232.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2233.
83. Id.
84. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796 (1984).
1989]
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challenging party must demonstrate that the statute's application to
their own behavior is unconstitutional. In first amendment claims,
the statute may also be invalid when it seeks to prohibit such a
broad range of protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally "ov-
erbroad."85 In this approach, the challenging party whose "own ex-
pressive conduct may validly be prohibited or sanctioned by the
statute is permitted to challenge [the statute] on its face because it
also threatens others not before the court."' 86 The litigating party,
however, has to demonstrate that the statute would substantially
impair exercise of the first amendment rights.
As stated previously, the facial nature of the Club Association's
challenge determined the scheme of analysis followed by the Su-
preme Court. Thus, the Court first examined whether the city or-
dinance would, in all its applications, unconstitutionally infringe upon
the clubs' private or expressive freedom of association and consid-
ered whether the ordinance's application would, in a "substantial
number of instances," unconstitutionally invade the Clubs' private
or expressive freedom of association. 87
The Court first found that the city ordinance would not infringe
"upon the private associational rights of each and every club covered
by it."88 The Court considered the clubs' size (at least 400 members)
and the provision of "regular meal service" 89 in exchange for "reg-
ular payments" 90 from non-members as "significant in defining the
non private nature of these associations." 9' The non-members' in-
volvement in the clubs' activities and the clubs' size prevented the
development of "private and intimate associations" to the extent
necessary to obtain constitutional protection. 92
85. Id. at 798.
86. The Supreme Court in Broadrick v. Oklahoma stated the underlying rationale of this anal-
ysis: "Litigants . . . are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression
are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression."
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
87. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233.
88. Id. at 2234.
89. Id. at 2233.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2233-34.
[Vol. 91
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The Court then held that the New York municipal ordinance,
by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race and sex, did not
prevent the clubs "in any significant way" from advocating their
desired points of view or from excluding the individuals that opposed
their view. 93 In other words, the clubs' expressive freedom of as-
sociation was not impaired by a city ordinance requiring them to
base their membership policy upon criteria other than sex and race.
The Court then examined the Club Association's contention that
the law was substantially overbroad because some clubs within its
scope of application were "distinctively private. ' 94 This argument
failed because the Club Association did not identify the clubs whose
associational or expressive rights would be impaired by the ordi-
nance's antidiscrimination provisions. The Court stressed that "[n]o
record was made in this respect, we are not informed of the char-
acteristics of any particular clubs, and hence we cannot conclude
that the law threatens to undermine the associational or expressive
purpose of any club, let alone a substantial number of them." ' 95
Finally, the Court rejected the Club Association's arguments that
the presumption drawn by the ordinance was irrebuttable and that
no club covered by the law could prove to be private in nature. 96
The Court stressed that, in any event, a club could always challenge
the constitutionality of the ordinance as applied to it and could
prove, therefore, to be private in nature. 97
In the future, the nature of the New York State Club Association
ruling will allow successful challenges to some private clubs' dis-
criminatory practices. However, important limitations exist in the
scope and application of this decision.
A state or a city's regulation is necessary to eradicate private
invidious discrimination. The fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution, which prohibits states from discriminating on
an invidious basis, has no application to the activities of private
93. Id. at 2234.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2235.
96. Id.
97. Id.
19891
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parties. 98 Therefore, private invidious discrimination is constitution-
ally permissible even if "it has never been accorded affirmative con-
stitutional protection." 99 Private discrimination is only subject to a
state's or a city's exercise of its police power. However, the state
or city regulation prohibiting such discrimination must promote a
"compelling interest" in order to warrant a freedom of association
invasion.' °° Therefore, absent a state's action and a state's interest,
a challenge to a private association's discriminatory policy will not
succeed.
The second limit to the New York State Club Association de-
cision results from the Supreme Court's admission that an associ-
ation or private club can always demonstrate that a nondiscriminatory
membership policy would impair the association's ability to express
its viewpoints:101
It is conceivable, of course, that an association might be able to show that it is
organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to advocate
its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to
those who have the same sex, for example, or the same religion .... 10,
It seems, therefore, that if an association can demonstrate that the
admission of minorities impairs its expressive right of association,
a challenge to the association's discriminatory policies can be de-
feated.
Finally, the clubs covered by the New York City ordinance were
public enough to justify the distinction drawn by the legislature.
They were clubs consisting of 400 or more members and allowing
a substantial involvement of non-members in their activities. Even
if the challenge failed in this case, it seems that a club one could
successfully allege a right of private association in different settings.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion made clear this point when
it stated that "in such a large city a club with over 400 members
may still be relatively intimate in nature, so that a constitutional
98. The text of the amendment makes no reference to private parties.
99. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973).
100. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609.
101. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234.
102. Id.
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right to control membership takes precedence.' '10 These consider-
ations therefore limit, to a great extent, the scope of the Court's
ruling and defeat the idea that discrimination in association mem-
bership policy is definitively eradicated.
The New York State Club Association also contended that the
New York City ordinance, by exempting from its application be-
nevolent and religious corporations, violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 104 In other words, the Club Association claimed that the law
treated differently those who are similarly situated. The Supreme
Court defined the standard of review applicable to this legislative
classification and refused to submit the classification to "heightened
scrutiny" to the extent that the clubs' fundamental interests were
not affected "in any significant way." 10 5
The Court required a showing by the Club Association that the
city could not reasonably believe that the benevolent and religious
corporations were different from other private clubs. 106 The Asso-
ciation had to prove that the legislative classification did not have
some "reasonable support" in fact. 10 7 The Club Association failed
to meet this burden. In denying the Club Association's constitutional
claim, the Court gave great consideration to the legislative findings
of the City that benevolent and religious organizations "have not
been identified in testimony before the Council as places where busi-
ness activity is prevalent.' 1 8 The Court also focused upon the special
treatment traditionally given by New York state law to benevolent
orders and religious corporations because they are "unique" to con-
clude that a rational basis existed for the distinction drawn by the
City. 1°9 Justice Scalia's concurring opinion stressed that the special
treatment conferred by New York state law upon religious corpo-
rations did not establish a rational basis for their exemption from
the New York City ordinance's application. 110 He required "at least
103. Id. at 2237 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 2235.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2236.
108. Id. at 2235-36.
109. Id. at 2236.
110. Id. at 2238 (Scalia J., concurring).
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some plausible connection between the respect in which [these be-
nevolent orders] are unique and the purpose of the law." 1 ' How-
ever, Justice Scalia found this plausible connection in the fact that
"such organizations did not significantly contribute to the problem
the city council was addressing." 112
V. CONCLUSION
As progeny of the Jaycee and Rotary decisions, the New York
State Club Association decision went a step further by upholding
the constitutionality of an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in
some private clubs. The step taken was more symbolic than con-
clusively creative. In New York State Club Association, the Court
held that the private clubs, under the scope of existing law, were
sufficiently public in nature to justify the state's interference with
their freedom of association."' However, there are private clubs which
undoubtedly involve more privacy and selectivity in the relationship
of their members, and there are private clubs which defend more
strongly expressive viewpoints than those involved in the case.
The question which remains unresolved by the New York State
Club Association decision is at what point a private club will be
deemed private enough to defeat any governmental intrusion re-
garding its membership policies. A reasonable approach is to think
that the more "private" the club, the weaker the governmental in-
terest in regulating it. However, at this point no bright line exists
to precisely define the limits of this analysis and a case-by-case ap-
proach will be necessary. Future decisions which address the chal-
lenges to come will hopefully provide the elements of the answer.
Isabelle Mouyssett
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2237 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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